1980 - 1984: x86, Rise of the twoscore-Year Stopgap

IBM PC Model 5150 and the Attack of the Clones

The only remarkable affair about the product that revolutionized the personal computing business organization was the fact that IBM built it. If any other company of the era built and marketed the IBM Personal Figurer Model 5150, it might be looked dorsum on with fondness but not as a product that changed an manufacture.

IBM's stature guaranteed the PC to initiate a level of standardization required for a applied science to attain widespread usage. That same stature also ensured competitors would have unfettered access to the technical specifications of the Model 5150, since IBM was obligated to disembalm such data under the Department of Justice 1956 consent decree, which the company operated nether equally an accommodation for its previous monopolistic practices.

The third facet of the Model 5150's enduring legacy came near from sourcing components via independent hardware vendors. IBM's business concern was built on the company designing and manufacturing well-nigh all of its hardware and software in firm, which maximized profit at the expense of overall agility in the market as corporate in-fighting and rivalries between divisions within such a monolithic company added inertia to the conclusion making processes.

The Datamaster was an all-in-1 calculator with text-way CRT brandish, keyboard, processor, memory, and two viii-inch floppy disk drives all independent in one chiffonier. (Photo: Oldcomputers.internet)

The Model 5150 wasn't IBM's start effort at building a personal computer, with at least iv previous projects being scrapped as the market moved faster than IBM'south corporate decision making. The Intel 8085-equipped System/23 DataMaster business concern computer also enduring a protracted development starting in February 1978. The DataMaster arrangement entry into the market in July 1981 led to the modify in design strategy in add-on to members of the pattern team being assigned work on the new PC project.

IBM'south original programme had been to design the personal estimator around Motorola's 6800 processor at its Austin, Texas inquiry eye. IBM marketing had arranged for the PC to be sold through the stores of Sears, Roebuck & Co., and the deal teetered in the remainder as Motorola's 6800 along with its support chips slipped in schedule.

A contingency plan named Project Chess was gear up to run concurrently with the Austin design and seemed to gain traction after Atari approached IBM about building a personal computer, if IBM were and then inclined to design one. Official IBM sanction was achieved when project director William (Bill) Lowe pledged to have the blueprint finalized in a year. To encounter this timescale, Lowe would source from vendors exterior IBM.

Project director William Lowe pledged to accept the design finalized in a year sourcing components from vendors exterior IBM.

What remained was choice of processor and operating system for the PC. Lowe and Estridge were acute enough to realize that IBM's senior direction would not await kindly upon a PC that posed a functioning threat to the company'southward lucrative business machines (a System/23 DataMaster last with printer listed for effectually $9,900 at the time).

The original intention seems to have been to use an 8-bit processor, which would have allowed MOS Tech's 6502, Zilog'southward Z80, and Intel's 8085 to be considered. However, IBM engineers favored the utilise of 16-bit, as did Bill Gates, who lobbied IBM to use 16-bit to fully showcase the operating system he was developing , while the arrival of 32-bit architectures from Motorola and National Semiconductor (the 68000 and 16032 respectively) were ready to enter production outside of the one twelvemonth borderline.

The eventual option was a compromise of 8-bit and 16-bit to allay concerns over compatibility with existing software and expansion options while reducing the bill of materials from a cheaper processor and support chips that were already available, and to retain a significant performance gap between the PC and IBM'southward business machines.

IBM'due south decision was made easier as the microprocessor landscape was becoming a war of attrition. MOS Tech was acquired by Commodore after MOS was financially decimated by Texas Instrument's calculator toll war and focus shifted from innovation to capitalizing on the success of the 6502. Western Design Center (WDC) would somewhen bring 16-bit computing to the 6500 series, merely equally with many microprocessor companies, the competition had rendered them all redundant past the time they were ready for market.

Zilog's fortunes also suffered a downturn, equally majority shareholder and later parent visitor Exxon was happy to run into the fledgling company go into breakneck product diversification. R&D expenditure topped 35% of revenue, while the wider range of development caused slippage in its ain sixteen-bit Z8000 processor equally Exxon'southward demands and the relative managerial inexperience of Federico Faggin became exposed.

Faggin and Ungermann had started Zilog to build microprocessors, but Exxon had bought Zilog equally a cog in a machine forth with a host of other electronics and software company acquisitions for a thou design they hoped would rival IBM. This would turn into a billion dollar failure.

Zilog's waning fortunes, even every bit its Z80 powered a prodigious number of computers, terminals, and industrial machines, too cascaded downwardly upon its second source licensees. AMD's license for Intel's 8085 hadn't translated into an invitation to do likewise with its follow up 8086 processor. For a viable 16-bit processor this left Jerry Sanders with the alternative of approaching Motorola or Zilog as National Semiconductors offering was shaping upwardly as promising much but delivering petty.

What remained was choice of processor and operating system for the PC, and IBM'south determination was made easier as the microprocessor mural was becoming a state of war of attrition.

With Motorola's delays and AMD'south disability to produce its ain competitive architecture, Zilog looked like the more attractive choice given that equally a relative newcomer it may have proved easier to piece of work with and the Z8000 became AMD's choice. The Z8000'southward lack of backwards compatibility with 8-bit software doomed sales of the processor, and customers that had flocked to the Z80 rapidly turned to Intel. Where Zilog had the successful Z80, and globe's largest oil company covering losses, AMD had no such options.

For its part, Intel had planned for a vast leap in processor architecture every bit soon as the 8080 had been completed. The envisaged flake, known internally as the 8816, would have been over four times the size of the existing 8-bit bit, with 16-bit and 32-bit functionality and a host of features that typify a modern processor.

Information technology became apparent in an Apr 14, 1976 assessment that the architecture would be a formidable challenge to produce, and most certainly not inside the timeframe needed to combat the 16-bit chips of Motorola, Zilog, National Semiconductor, and Texas Instruments.

Intel required at least an interim design to fend off the contest and continue its growth and software group manager Terry Opdendyk accepted the challenge of designing a new processor architecture inside of 10 weeks -- the estimated maximum length of time required for the chip to be completed in a year. Opdendyk chose Steve Morse, an engineer specializing in software and the author of the condemnatory 8816 review that initiated this project, marking the first time that design of an Intel chip architecture hadn't been the responsibleness of hardware engineers.


Die shot of the 16-bit Intel 8086 microprocessor. The 8086 gave ascent to the famed x86 architecture which eventually turned out as Intel's most successful line of processors.

Architecture design work started in May with the 2-homo squad of Morse and project manager Beak Pohlman, and the first revision of the compages was duly completed in August. Two stipulations were imposed on the design: it needed backwards compatibility with the 8080 and it needed to address memory upwardly to 128KB, double that of the 8080.

The answer to the second problem was solved by an bad-mannered method of segmented addressing to let xx-bit memory addresses with a chip that handled data 16 bits at a time which immune for upwardly to i megabyte of retentivity to exist addressed. Every bit inelegant as the resulting 8086 solution was when it arrived on June 8, 1978, it immune Intel to trounce both Motorola and Zilog in the race to a commercially viable sixteen-fleck processor.

Intel followed up on the 8086 a yr later on with a cost reduced 8088 that halved the 8086's external bus from 16-chip to 8-bit targeting tighter budgets and customers seeking to extend the life of their 8080 and 8085-based systems and associated software.

While Motorola'south own 16-bit processor, the 68000, wasn't launched until a full xv months afterward the 8086, its design had claim over the 8086 which outset Intel'south initial market lead as soon as it began sampling. Whereas Zilog was seen every bit a pocket-size company regardless of the corporeality of coin being pumped into it by Exxon, Motorola was an established semiconductor company with a proven rails record and high market place visibility.


The original Apple Macintosh and early successors apply the Motorola 68000 processor every bit their CPU.

Upwardly to this indicate, Intel never really had to "sell" products to customers. Its production lines were mostly superior to (or at to the lowest degree the equal of) the competition and need often exceeded supply. Consequently, Intel salesmanship often amounted to a mix of complacency and arrogance, and customers relished the chance to push back confronting the company's attitude.

Against this properties, Intel instituted its first national marketing campaign spurred past an eight-page report detailing Motorola's pattern wins at Intel's expense from Don Buckhout, an East Coast Field Applications Engineer (FAE). The company set a goal of securing one pattern win per month for a year from each of its 170 sales representatives (a nominal 2000 design wins past December 1980) every bit part of Operation Crush, a name inspired past the Denver Bronco's "Orange Beat" 3-4 defense besides equally the entrada's stated aim of crushing Motorola.

When faced with a superior processor, Intel would emphasize the organisation equally a whole including back up chips, an expanse where Motorola was relatively weak. Intel was processor-centric while microprocessors represented but a small part of Motorola'southward diverse company. Intel unashamedly played on the fear, doubt and doubt of customers past request whether Motorola could sustain support, integration, and future products.

Faced with the superior 68000 processor, Intel would emphasize the organization as a whole including support chips, an area where Motorola was relatively weak.

While Intel's corporate character did not ingratiate the company to those who had to deal with it, its level of technical support and products were undeniable. Intel abased its corporate ethos of never publicizing a product until its production was under manner, allying the PR of a time to come product line with an extensive 100-page catalog of its chip developments.

Rather than concentrating on the 68000 where it had a marketing and technical advantage, Motorola took the bait and tried to respond Intel's all the same to be built products with its ain more meager alternatives. From that point, Motorola and the 68000'southward position of ability evaporated.

Intel's goal had been to gain 2000 design wins by December 1980. Such was the success of Operation Crush that the final figure was closer to 2500, in role due to the added incentive of a prize for the about wins bought in by a salesman and their FAE. Bill Handel won with nearly 100 contracts including one for use in an electronic temperature monitoring brassiere that supposedly notified the wearer of the optimum time for formulation. Handel and his FAE were each awarded 86 shares Intel stock every bit first prize, and along with every other sales representative who met their quota, a junket to Tahiti.

While Bill Handel might have won Performance Crush'due south competition, Earl Whetstone, a salesman on the opposite coast, took a run a risk to add to his own tally by calling IBM's Boca Raton development laboratory, despite IBM's history of designing its processors in-business firm. Every bit luck would have it, IBM's Project Chess had but been initiated. Operation Vanquish had been set up in motion to maximize the 8086's exposure, merely the biggest design win of the nigh 2500 achieved was the stripped down 8088 eight-flake external/16-bit internal bus hybrid chip (developed from the 8086) landing in the IBM PC Model 5150.


IBM Personal Computer model 5150 with IBM CGA monitor, IBM PC keyboard, IBM 5152 printer and newspaper stand.

Like the visitor's mainframe business, the IBM PC was designed for a high degree of customization. All the same, whereas the modularity of the mainframe came from IBM-built parts, the PC would draw on the wider opportunities afforded by contained vendors. Two split up graphics adapters were bachelor, CGA (Colour Graphics Adapter) targeting the home user and the MDA (Monochrome Display Adapter) for commercial users that included a matrix printer port. The IBM-designed mainboard offered plenty expansion ports (five) for most users also equally a fairly wide range of RAM, storage, and printer options.

Intel's Functioning Crush was a resounding success, simply the biggest design win of the nigh 2500 achieved was the stripped downwards 8088 8-flake external/sixteen-bit internal charabanc hybrid chip landing in the IBM PC Model 5150.

IBM's choice of operating system was to be outsourced too. The DataMaster's lengthy gestation was largely attributed to a change in design philosophy regarding the choice of Bones interpreter for the system during its development phase and IBM had taken the lesson to center. The verbal chain of events that followed IBM's decision to use Microsoft's solution aren't entirely clear, merely it began with IBM approaching Gary Kildall's Digital Inquiry.

During the formative years of the personal estimator industry, Kildall's CP/M had been the pick of operating systems for many vendors. While Kildall concentrated on the Os side of the street, Neb Gates and Paul Allen had focused on programming language variants of Basic. An unspoken contract seemed to exist that neither company would intrude on the other's specialty.

This organization would sour with Digital Research Inc.'s (DRI) close association with and later acquisition of Compiler Systems, which was run by i of Kildall'southward graduate students, Gordon Eubanks, who had written a version of Basic (CBASIC) for IMSAI. Shopping for an operating system, IBM arranged to see with Kildall with a view to adapting CP/Chiliad to the 8086 and 8088 processors.

When IBM representative Jack Sams arrived at DRI to discuss the proposal, Kildall wasn't in the office and when confronted by IBM'south infamous and one-sided NDA, Dorothy Kildall refused until she could seek a legal opinion. It seems probable that Kildall arrived for the meeting many hours subsequently and too late to discuss specifics. Sams then flew to Seattle to meet with Bill Gates.

What seems certain is that Kildall's casual demeanor was at odds with Sam's (and by extension IBM's) corporate philosophy. The level of professionalism and deference that should be accorded to one of America's largest companies was distinctly lacking. Kildall's lack of urgency in accelerating what would go CP/M-86, a uniform OS for the 8086/8088, too stands out as a major stumbling block. Bill Gates however was acutely aware of IBM's stature and was quite willing to acquiesce to IBM'southward demands if information technology meant building his business.

The only real problem Bill Gates had was that he didn't accept an operating system to sell to IBM -- but knew of someone who did. Gates approached Seattle Computer Products whose SCP-200B evolution kit utilized the 8086. While SCP sold the kits, it had been faced with the same lack of operating system equally other 8086 vendors. The solution became to design its own -- pattern being a fairly loose term, every bit SCP's Tim Paterson borrowed heavily from the existing CP/M by scrupulously copying the Os's API calls (which the OS uses to collaborate with other software).

Bill Gates was willing to accede to IBM'south demands if it meant building his business. The only real trouble was that he didn't have an OS to sell -- but knew of someone who did.

The resultant QDOS (Quick and Dirty Operating System) debuted in July 1980, a full month earlier IBM went looking for the same thing from DRI and Microsoft, although information technology wouldn't start aircraft until the stop of September. SCP's loss instantly turned into Microsoft'due south exceedingly big gain as Bill Gates and Microsoft's beginning business manager Steve Ballmer pitched to IBM a license understanding for the newly found operating organisation, associated software, and four programming languages on a royalty basis.

Importantly, Microsoft was to remain gratis to license MS-DOS to other vendors.


Paul Allen and Bill Gates pose adjacent to a few early desktop systems.

IBM duly accepted and handed over a $700,000 advance a week later QDOS had been secured past Microsoft. Obtaining the operating system without alerting SCP to its empire-building promise had fallen to Paul Allen, who negotiated a per-license agreement with SCP at $10,000 per customer plus $5,000 if the source lawmaking was included and a $10,000 advance to seal the deal. The implication was that Gates and Allen had a large number of licensees locked upward although a clause in the agreement stated that Microsoft's customer list was confidential -- a client listing that numbered a unmarried client.

Tim Paterson was soon added to the Microsoft workforce when 86-DOS, equally it was so known, needed revision at IBM'south behest. By the time the IBM PC was ready for release, Rod Brock, SCP'southward owner, was nearing bankruptcy as the 86-DOS licensees had failed to materialize. With his programmer long gone and lacking the funds to stay afloat, Brock accepted Gates' offer to sell 86-DOS to Microsoft for $50,000 -- the equivalent of ii minutes worth of sales at the height of the software'south popularity a decade later as MS-DOS.


The commencement version of DOS had no support for difficult disks, directories or loadable device drivers. (Photo: OS/two Museum)

A major consideration for IBM was the integrity of its supply chain. With other IBM products that meant one division of the company delivering products to some other. Outsourcing components was a mutual practise in an industry where manufacturing and yield issues were rife, so over the strong objections of Intel, IBM demanded a second source for the 8088.

Second sourcing as well had the added advantage of introducing another level of quality control as processors from each company could be compared for performance and adherence to shipping schedule. IBM'southward preferred second source, AMD, only so happened to be looking to replace its ill-selling licensed copy of the Zilog Z8000, the AMZ8000.

With Motorola's microprocessor market place share plummeting to a mere 15% equally a event of Functioning Beat, the standout candidate became adequately obvious.

Intel and AMD hammered out a deal in February 1982. Intel for its part fulfilled IBM's edict, and AMD, knowing that Intel's position was weakened due to IBM's duress, extracted a lengthy license understanding. AMD would pay royalties to Intel for three years, at which time the payments would be weighted co-ordinate to value when and if Intel decided to take up options for licensing AMD products. This role of the agreement was to terminal for at to the lowest degree v years of the ten provided for.

Equally the IBM PC neared introduction, the main talking points were of an affordable computer for the consumer, made by an iconic American visitor. Enthusiasts tended to notation the use of BIOS, IBM's attention to system integrity with the 14-footstep power-on self-test (Mail service) sequence, and the comprehensive user manual -- all taken for granted now, but groundbreaking in 1981.

No existent base configuration for the IBM PC existed equally set by the company, but a $i,595 price is often quoted for the machine in its unbundled form. A fully optioned version topped $6,000 with actress hardware such every bit dual floppy drives, retention expansion kits and additional operating systems (Basic was included, MS-DOS added $40, CP/G-86 was $240 and UCSD p-Organization cost $695 -- CP/Chiliad-86 being included to forestall any adverse publicity from Digital Research).


CP/Grand-86 was a version of the CP/M operating system from Digital Research for the Intel 8086 and Intel 8088.

For IBM PC owners desperate to run CP/M, an add together-in co-processor lath such every bit Xedex'south Z80-equipped Infant Blueish card could be procured. The average cost of the thirteen,533 PCs sold past the year's stop (against accelerate orders for over 35,000) was around $3,000. The IBM Model 5150'southward sales would reach 50,000 inside six months, and 200,000 after a year.

The arrival of the Model 5150 did not alter the personal computing landscape at the time. The auto was too expensive for many, and like the Apple Two, sales stemmed more from business users. The IBM PC became a safe option because of the reputation of the visitor continuing backside it. The PC's effect on the industry wouldn't be felt until "IBM" became less of a selling point than "IBM Compatible".

The 13,533 PCs sold by IBM in the closing months of 1981 represented less than 1% of total sales and 1.ix% of revenue for the $3 billion personal computer market place, while Radio Shack and Apple deemed for a combined 37% of the sales (20% and 17% respectively). What the IBM PC would achieve was an almost instantaneous heave to the add together-in board marketplace, and a solid base for software developers.

Edifice on this growth, 1982 would double personal computer shipment from the previous twelvemonth with 2.eight 1000000 sold worldwide. A significant function of this grown occurred with the arrival of the Commodore 64 which would redefine the budget of the PC marketplace previously the province of the company'south own VIC twenty, Atari'due south 400 and 800, and the TRS 80, while low-end machines such as Sinclair'due south ZX81 intruded upon pricing until now reserved for pocket calculators.

The arrival of the Model 5150 did not modify the personal computing landscape at the time, but information technology became a safe option because of the company standing backside it. Its effect on the industry wouldn't be felt until "IBM" became less of a selling signal than "IBM Uniform".

These lower entry level machines boosted the gaming entertainment mural while the Commodore 64 maintained the momentum gained by the sprite-driven graphics lineage of the Atari 2600, although graphics were about to be given a serious makeover. 1982 also saw the founding of SGI, Hercules, Diamond Multimedia, Orchid Technology, Number Nine, Autodesk'due south AutoCAD, Electronic Arts, and On-Line became Sierra On-Line equally the company grew in scope with its association with IBM every bit did MSA'southward Peachtree Bookkeeping software, IUS's EasyWriter, ISS's WordPerfect, and the spreadsheet application synonymous with the IBM PC, Lotus 1-ii-three.

The venture capital that enabled Lotus Software to begin operation originated in office from the ii people that had supplied start-upward funding for Silicon Graphics (SGI) and Electronics Arts. Fifty.J.Sevin and Ben Rosen also provided one-half the initial capital for Compaq Computers. Formed by three disgruntled Texas Instruments engineers, and soon to be followed past many more hires from T.I., the three had seen a marketplace for a portable version of IBM'due south PC.

Compaq was far from alone in apace noticing that the PC's sales were driven more by the software bachelor to it than the sum of the hardware in the machine, so the platonic product would be one that could use software that already existed. With IBM leading the way information technology was a pretty prophylactic bet that its standard would succeed in the market place -- by force of volition if necessary. Information technology was an added bonus existence able to marry itself (still tangentially) with Big Blue by marketing its product equally "IBM PC Compatible".

Companies looking to ride the coattails of a market place leader were nothing new. Franklin Computer had released an exact copy of the Apple II equally the Ace 100 and Apple quickly prosecuted a case confronting Franklin who would continue to plagiarize Apple tree's pattern until August 1983 when the U.Due south. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Apple tree.

IBM's just protection against similar imitators would be its BIOS, and the company'southward false supposition that competitors could not source the components cheaper than Big Blue.

Columbia Data Product'due south MPC 1600 became the first IBM PC clone in June 1982, and although cheaper than the Model 5150 by around a third, the reverse engineered BIOS wasn't fully compatible with IBM hardware or the software suite. Eagle Computers, Corona and Handwell attempted the less labor-intensive option of starting with IBM's BIOS, the complete lawmaking for which IBM had included in its PC's transmission, which but got IBM'southward formidable team of lawyers involved. Several vendors would also await to meliorate upon the Model 5150's feature set, notably DEC'southward Rainbow 100 and Seequa's Chameleon, both of which featured a Z80 in addition to the 8088, and both would fail commercially without total IBM PC compatibility.

Compaq on the other hand consulted its lawyers earlier starting a PC project and to protect itself used a "clean room" approach with the BIOS programmer never having seen the original IBM lawmaking. Phoenix Technologies would proceed to employ the same methodology to engineer its BIOS ROM resulting in any visitor existence able to purchase IBM compatibility off the shelf for $25 a scrap and a $290,000 license fee.


The Compaq Portable was the get-go 100% IBM-compatible PC, and the first portable i. (Photograph: Maximum PC)

Compaq'due south first product was the Portable Personal Computer, publicly launched on November 4, 1982, and the first machine completely uniform on a hardware and software basis with IBM's Model 5150. The outset 300 machines shipped in January 1983 with l,000 sold past twelvemonth end -- part of the million 8088-based computers sold to that date. Although sales number for the year didn't indicate it (IBM sold half a million PCs during 1983 and Apple tree sold 750,000 which combined equaled sales of the Commodore 64), the arrival of the clones and Compaq in particular signaled the finish of IBM's brusk-lived potency in the market. The driving forces would from now on exist companies that powered both the PC and its imitators, Intel and Microsoft.

Apple's business organization included neither Intel nor Microsoft and on the face of it seemed to be booming. The visitor shipped its ane-millionth Apple tree 2 in June 1983 and continued to be a large seller until the Macintosh became the company's focus. Balanced against this was the relative flop of the Apple tree Iii, doomed by poor attention to detail during design and a robotic associates line that failed to seat chips into circuit boards with enough force per unit area to ensure correct contact.

The inflow of the clones and Compaq in particular signaled the end of IBM's short-lived dominance in the market. The driving forces would from now on exist companies that powered both the PC and its imitators, Intel and Microsoft.

Apple tree's recommendation of raising the auto a few inches then dropping it to reseat components and repeating until the machine regained its function seemed similar a less than professional person workaround to its users. The Lisa project, which grew out of Steve Jobs' middle opening visit to Xerox PARC in December 1979, also became a drain on resources. R&D for Jobs to recreate PARC's wonderland of networked Alto workstations topped $50 meg -- a k times the Apple II'southward development price of -- but at least the technology was successfully applied to afterward products fifty-fifty if the resulting Lisa was limited to around 100,000 units sold.

The principle drawback of the Apple Lisa was cost. At $10,000 per automobile, the target market was small and made smaller with the Lisa'south lack of networking capability.

Apple tree rectified the cost (and customer expectation that comes from it) with the Macintosh, a project developed in tandem with Lisa, which incorporated many of the aforementioned features in a simpler design costing only a quarter of the Lisa's toll tag. A Ridley Scott directed commercial using George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four motif widely regarded as the pinnacle of ad preceded its successful launch in January 1984.

The Macintosh would continue to drive Apple tree's competitive market place share with steady sales, although pricing and subsequent acquirement vicious consistently as Windows three.0, and more importantly, associated productivity applications such as Excel and Give-and-take began to encroach into traditional Apple tree Mac strongholds.

Total sales of personal computers in the first four years since the Altair's introduction had amounted to 200,000 machines worldwide. A decade later, the twelvemonth of 1988 would run across xix one thousand thousand personal computers shipped. A business that started in garages by hobbyists had turned into a multi-billion dollar manufacture where the esprit of enthusiasts had been replaced past cutthroat marketplace competition -- a competition that was virtually to meet the patent and intellectual property wielded as economic weapons.

This commodity is the third installment on a serial of five. If you enjoyed this, read on as get into a decade of steady growth and the consolidation of power from those that endured the industry's intense rivalries.

Bonus video

Masthead image and video in a higher place past YouTube user 41D57.